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The Declining Utility of Analyzing Burdens of
Persuasion
Ronald J. Allen*
FESTSCHRIFT FOR MICHAEL RISINGER
The title of this panel is “The Weight of Burdens: Decision Thresholds
and how to get ordinary people to operationalize them the way we want them
to.” I am a somewhat odd choice to be answering that question, since, apart
from a few aberrational efforts during my misbegotten youth1 when I was
not thinking clearly about the distinction between normative and positive
work, my research program is as positive as I can make it. The closest to
this title that an aspect of my research program attempts to shed light on is
the question of the nature of juridical proof rather than what it should be or
how do we get jurors to act in one way or another. To be sure, once one has
a confident grasp of the answer to that question, normative proselytizing can
begin, by those who wish to do it, either to enhance or modify the structure
in place—but that is not a serious motivation of my work. I cheerily assume
that, generally speaking (a point soon to be developed further), fact finders
(judges are no different from jurors) do exactly what we ask them to do,
which is to determine to their best ability what actually happened concerning
a litigated event, and apply the law as they understand it to the facts that are
found.2 For me, one of the interesting questions is the extent to which the
*
John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law;
President, International Association of Evidence and Forensic Science; Fellow, The Forensic
Science Institute, China University of Political Science and Law.
1
References provided on request.
2
This cheery assumption received considerable vindication from the Arizona Jury
Project. The authors summarize the empirical data:

The conventional wisdom on jury comprehension of legal instructions
is only partially correct: juries do struggle with jury instructions, and
they sometimes misapply legal rules in reaching their verdicts. With
some important exceptions, however, the deliberations of the Arizona
jurors as they discussed legal issues were remarkably consistent with
the instructions they received. Moreover, the evidence presented here
shows that deliberations do assist in resolving individual
misunderstandings. The jurors in Arizona, armed with individual
copies of the jury instructions, were able to correct nearly half of the
errors made during their deliberations.
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American legal system facilitates or retards that effort, and with what costs
and benefits, rather than how we get “them” to do what we want them to do.
That question leads in turn to my major research program on the nature of
juridical proof.3
In analyzing the question of the nature of juridical proof, the evidence
literature spends an inordinate amount of effort on burdens of proof and the
so-called proof paradoxes such as the conjunction effect. I bear some
responsibility for this, having once also looked at the problem through that
lens.4 Although that early literature was interesting and helpful in many
respects, in my opinion the fascination with the proof paradoxes, and thus
the burden of proof, has become unproductive. It continues to generate what
Kevin Clermont refers to as “contortions,”5 of which I will show his is a
prime example, in order to explain away something that cannot be explained
away. The conjunction effect is a feature of the world; it is not a feature of
our explanation of the world. If more than one conclusion needs to be
reached to decide some issue (whatever it is), and if a false positive on any
would render a mistaken decision, then errors will accumulate as a function
of errors on those discrete conclusions. Simple as that. One can pretend this
does not exist and/or its consequences are trivial,6 accept it and move on,7 or
wish it away apparently from the belief that changing one’s views of
probability will change the external world.8 But, whatever you do, it is not
going away.

Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful Of Law” In Real Jury
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, And Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1605 (2012).
Moreover, some of the “errors” were actually deliberate forms of jury nullification, which the
authors call “resistance errors.” Id. at 1601.
3
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373,
373–422 (1991); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in
Plausible Reasoning, 21 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 133, 133–42 (2017).
4
Of the many sources of evidence for this sin, see Ronald J. Allen, A
Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 401–37 (1986).
5
Kevin M. Clermont, Common Sense on Standards of Proof (Cornell Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 17-37, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007129. Ronald J. Allen &
Michael S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF
(forthcoming 2019) (providing a thorough discussion of this and other competitors of the
relative plausibility theory).
6
See David S. Schwartz & Elliott Sober, The Conjunctions Problem and the Logic of
Jury Findings, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619 (2017).
7
See DALE A. NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY POWER, WEIGHT OF
EVIDENCE, AND TENACITY OF BELIEF (2016); Mark Spottswood, Unraveling the Conjunction
Paradox, 15 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 259 (2016).
8
See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD (2013).
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One reason for the continued fascination with burdens of proof is the
belief that the conjunction effect is the biggest obstacle to a robust
probabilistic interpretation of juridical proof, and again I bear some
responsibility for this, for which I would like to publicly apologize after all
these years.9 The proof paradoxes were the grains of sand in the oyster that
stimulated thought, to mix metaphors, but they were never the heart of the
problem for precisely the reason just mentioned: features of the world will
not be changed by changing our mental apparatus. The significance of the
proof paradoxes, in my opinion, lies solely in their opening up skepticism
about whether a potentially powerful account of juridical proof with a
probabilistic foundation was justifiable. It turns out it was not, but again not
just because of this feature of the world. Any explanation of juridical proof
must give an account of this aspect of the world to have any chance of
success.
Rather, the deeper problem is that no interpretation of probability
makes much sense in the context of litigation. Much of the literature just
ignores this point, which makes that part of the literature completely
uninteresting.10 Those who recognize the deep problem here branched into
two directions, one explaining proof at trial as involving plausible reasoning
(of which probability is a part)11 and the other embracing some form of
subjective probability.12 The difficulty with the subjective probability move
is that it is indeed subjective. Subjective probability was not designed for
and cannot easily accommodate truth conducive procedures; it was designed
to elicit personal views and to maintain consistency among them. It is true
that if subjective views are systematically updated with data in the form of
objective likelihoods, there are reasons to believe that the final conclusions
of different decision makers will converge, and occasionally converge on the

9

It all started in 1986. See Allen, supra note 4; see also Ronald J. Allen, Factual
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 604 (1994) (arguing that the
“most damaging” proof paradox tending to undermine “the conventional [probabilistic] view”
of burdens of proof is “the remarkable consequences of the conjunctive effect implicit in the
conventional theory”).
10
Reading other people’s work, I have often thought that the authors of sentences like
the one to which this footnote is attached should be required to give references, but at the
moment I am happy to be relieved of such an obligation.
11
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of
Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557 (2013); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and
the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 223–68 (2008).
12
CLERMONT, supra note 8; NANCE, supra note 7. An astonishing example of this is
KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 483 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 6th ed.
2006), where the authors claim that certain instructions are misleading because they “divert
attention to the evidence,” whereas they should focus on the degree of the juror’s belief. As
Susan Haack pithily put it, “this has things exactly backwards.” SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE
MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 52 (2014).
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truth;13 but objective data in this form is precisely what virtually never exists
at trial and is the original cause of the failure of probabilistic explanations
(supplemented with computational intractability, which again while true is
not the central problem).
This is what led scholars to explore other explanations, and as Clermont
points out, the most durable of these has been relative plausibility.14 But
relative plausibility is not simply an explanation of the burden of persuasion
instructions; it is an explanation that encompasses the entire proof process.
The American legal system, generally speaking: (1) encourages the
presentation of competing explanations of the relevant events; (2) in civil
cases, makes the evidence necessary to support those explanations available
(and to some extent also in criminal cases); (3) provides liberal rules of
admission to allow the parties to tailor their cases to their best advantage;
and (4) encourages articulations by both parties of the theory of the case in
pleadings, discovery, opening statements, and closing arguments. Lawyers
regularly describe their activity as showing that “their version of the case” is
what happened,15 and courts routinely point out the obvious—that the
“probability” of something happening depends on the alternatives.16
This last point deserves some elaboration. The central idea of relative
plausibility is that fact finders employ their full panoply of cognitive tools,
assisted by the parties, to judge which explanation or combination of
explanations is the most plausible, and by doing so, to determine the most
likely explanations of events. So, at the end of the day, relative plausibility
incorporates elements of probability explanations; errors are kept under
control and allocated appropriately by deciding for the most plausible
explanation or set of explanations in civil cases and deciding whether there
are plausible stories of guilt and innocence in criminal cases. The point,
however, is that the judgment of plausibility is done using conventional
cognitive tools such as appraisals of consistency, coverage, etc., and as I will
13
Allen, supra note 3; Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF (SPECIAL ISSUE) 254 (1997).
14
See CLERMONT, supra note 8.
15
A useful collection of such descriptions is the NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, POWERFUL WORDS: STORYTELLING & PERSUASION TECHNIQUES FOR
COMMUNICATING YOUR THEORY OF THE DEFENSE (2016). Virtually never is the “theory of the
defense” that a discrete element is false. It is rather that the defense “story” is inconsistent
with guilt.
16
See, e.g., Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Beard 354 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2004). In criminal cases, the issue is whether there is a
plausible story of guilt and no plausible story of innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Newell,
239 F.3d 917, 920 (7th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court acknowledged the relative nature of
proof in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 437–38 (2002) (finding
that the City justified its statute restricting adult businesses, the Court said: “Neither the Court
of Appeals, nor respondents, nor the dissent provides any reason to question the city’s theory.
In particular, they do not offer a competing theory”).
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turn to in a moment, Michael Risinger’s interesting suggestion of surprise—
but none of this can be done unless there are alternatives. And the alternative
in American litigation virtually never is that the plaintiff’s explanation is
false. Rather, the alternative is that the defendant’s explanation is true, and
thus the plaintiff’s explanation is false. Analytically this need not be true—
a point that Clermont exploits17—but practically it is. Otherwise, plaintiffs
would have to show half plus one of the ways the world could have been
favor liability, or criminal defendants could defend successfully by bringing
in the phone book or some other weird “contortion.”18 Observation shows
those are not the world we actually live in.
A few counter-examples can be given to the relative plausibility
explanation. Surely once in a while a defendant does little more than attempt
to negate an element (and I predict they almost always lose), and
occasionally there is substantial relative frequency data that permits
probabilistic explanations to dominate. But one should not ask too much of
an explanation or theory in this context. Both the legal system generally and
the litigation process specifically are not top-down made systems
explainable by simple propositions emanating from their creators. Rather,
they are bottom-up grown systems. To use an image I frequently invoke,
they are more like rain forests than tree farms. They are complex adaptive
systems, rather than simple static systems.19 There will always be counterexamples to any explanation of such systems. Thus, the important question
is not whether any particular theory suffers from no counter-examples, but
instead the extent to which it advances understanding. On that score, all the
recent writings on burdens of proof have their merits, although none of them
has the explanatory force or scope of relative plausibility, in my humble
opinion.
Ironically, given the fascination with the conjunction effect and relative
plausibility, the present instructions, which obviously focus the fact finder’s
attention on each element,20 are at least superficially as much of a problem
17
This is what motivates his discussion of, and reliance on, belief functions. CLERMONT,
supra note 8, at 201.
18
Clermont tries to avoid this by suggesting that there is an unallocated belief between
X and not-X, but he completely ignores where any belief in not-X comes from. I suggest it
typically comes from the defendant who provides evidence of Y, which entails not-X.
19
Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1047
(2011).
20
This was systematically established in Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of
Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893 (2003).
Professor Nance remains unconvinced, and recently reiterated that a number of pattern jury
instructions are “consistent” with requiring findings of the conjunction of the elements.
NANCE, supra note 7, at 76–77. Michael S. Pardo and I in a forthcoming article, Relative
Plausibility and Its Critics, systematically dismantle these types of assertions. Just as one of
many examples, when one looks at the actual instructions given in pertinent cases, one finds

ALLEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1000

8/8/2018 12:23 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:995

for relative plausibility as any of these other attempts to explain juridical
proof (I explain its resolution at the end of this essay). That is why the
analysis moved beyond them to embed them in their larger context. They
are, as it were, the odd man out. There is simply an unavoidable tension
between looking at elements discretely, if the question is the truth OR NOT
of some element, and any sensible approach to burdens of persuasion. Thus
I tend to agree with Professor Dale A. Nance’s view that they express
necessary but not sufficient conditions.21 What is sufficient, however, is not
the conjunction of the elements. That, too, suffers from debilitating
problems. Without knowing what the alternatives are, one cannot assign
probability or anything else to an explanation except to say that it is plausible
(or not) given the evidence. And one can say that only because no alternative
has been produced; there is thus one explanation backed by evidence, which
must be the case, so far as anyone can tell, in the absence of any other. One
has to know what it is competing with, as the legal system recognizes over
and over again, in order to know who wins. If there is no competition, the
one explanation standing, whether in civil or criminal cases, wins.
Consequently, it is not quite accurate to assert that the relative
plausibility theory “contort[s itself] in efforts to find ways to live with the
law’s approach.”22 Instead, it points out how the American legal system
evolved a means of controlling its consequences. Rather than have fact
finders focus on the elements OR NOT of a plaintiff’s case, regardless of
what the instruction on the burden of persuasion actually says, the American
legal system encourages the presentation of alternative explanations,23 which
cases like In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, in which the Court of Appeals
approved jury instructions and a special verdict form that had the effect of adopting the
plaintiff’s requested instruction that: “If you find that the plaintiffs have established these two
elements by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the plaintiffs. If
the plaintiffs have not established both elements, then your verdict must be for the
defendants.” In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir.
1985). The disagreement in the case was over the substantive law, not over whether findings
of each element was sufficient for a verdict. Id.
21
See, e.g., supra note 7, at 73074.
22
Clermont, supra note 5, at 2.
23
For some reason, the critics of the relative plausibility theory assert that it is committed
to the story model of jury decision-making propounded by Pennington and Hastie. See
Clermont, supra note 5. This is a peculiar assertion. The work of Pennington and Hastie
certainly supplies some empirical support for the relative plausibility explanation, as does the
more important work of the Arizona Jury Project which finds that jurors attempt to construct
the most plausible account of the litigated events. See, e.g., Diamond, Murphy & Rose, supra
note 2, at 1575. “They actively search for ways to make sense of events about which they are
told, consciously or unconsciously filling in blanks and resolving ambiguities to produce a
plausible account and arrive at what they understand to be a just verdict consistent with the
evidence and instructions.” Id. But explanations can come in many different forms. If a
party chooses to provide something other than a coherent chronological narrative, there is
nothing that stops it from doing so, and nothing inconsistent in doing so with the relative
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distributes the logical problems over both sides of the dispute. This has been
known for a long time.24 A more recent addendum to the explanation of
juridical proof is the recognition of the massive overlapping of evidence that
tends to occur at trial. Most of what plaintiffs (including the state in criminal
cases) and defendants assert is quite consistent, with the parties choosing to
dispute only parts of the overall explanations.25 As the range of the dispute
narrows, the logical problems diminish as well.
Professor Risinger now adds to the literature a novel exegesis on
burdens of persuasion that focuses on the surprise that a fact finder would
feel if he or she learned that a mistake had been made.26 As with all of
Professor Risinger’s writings, this is both insightful and provocative. It is
also his first foray into this particular territory, so far as I know, and not
surprisingly the proposal is somewhat underdeveloped. I thus commend its
creativity and offer a few suggestions.27 First, although Professor Risinger
wisely eschews conventional probability theory as a main component in his
proposal, nonetheless at this stage in development it appears to bear some
relationship to the proposals of the original creators of formalized subjective
probability. It is basically an algorithm for determining the extent of one’s
commitments to certain propositions or drawing out one’s utility functions
and preferences. Leonard J. Savage, Bruno De Finetti, and others asked

plausibility theory. Whatever explanation is offered will be considered in light of its
alternatives. For a discussion of the differences between the story model and explanations,
see Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547,
598–99 (2013).
Critics also consistently assert that the relative plausibility theory cannot accommodate
intermediate standards of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence. NANCE, supra note
7, at 82 n.219. This is an equally peculiar assertion. It is equivalent to saying that human
decision-making does not encompass the view that some explanations are much more
plausible than others, or equivalently that without the apparatus of probability theory
statements such as “I think it is much more likely to rain tomorrow than be sunny,” are
meaningless. Such statements lack the false precision of a probability statement, but they are
perfectly comprehensible. Indeed, one of the ironies of the probability debates is that critics,
such as Professor Nance, who make such points never define what “clear and convincing”
evidence is within their framework. Or beyond reasonable doubt, either. Again, the relative
plausibility theory handles things naturally, or as Professor Clermont might say, with good
common sense.
24
Allen, supra note 4, at 426.
25
Pardo, supra note 23, at 576–87.
26
Michael D. Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply that We
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965
(2018).
27
My frequent co-author, Michael S. Pardo, provides a philosophically rich and
interesting discussion of Risinger’s proposal and its relationship to relative plausibility, and
so I content myself here with a few gap filling comments. Michael S. Pardo, Epistemology,
Psychology, and Standards of Proof: An Essay on Risinger’s “Surprise” Theory, 48 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1039 (2018).
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different questions but they were put to similar purposes.28 The difference
between the subjectivists and Shackle to some extent lies in the definiteness
with which an answer must be given, but it is not clear to me how much of a
difference that difference makes in the juridical context. Asking people if
they would be really surprised sounds similar to asking them if they would
make a really big bet on the truth of some proposition. One loses much of
the ability to compute easily without cardinal answers, but you get the same
basic output. Or so it seems to me at the moment. I look forward to further
explication from Professor Risinger.
The second point is perhaps more fundamental, and it is one that
Professor Risinger alludes to but does not develop, and that is the ambiguous
relationship between ex ante and ex post analysis. Ex ante, the question fact
finders face is whether a burden of persuasion has been satisfied, however
that is accomplished. In asking fact finders how surprised they would be to
find out they were wrong, what ex post counter-factual worlds may be
considered? Whether some new evidence might appear? Whether some
probative evidence was excluded? Whether witnesses lied? Whether the
government planted inculpatory evidence? Whether the defendant murdered
a potentially important witness? I suspect, ex post, I would be very surprised
by some outcomes, but not others. How the surprise theory handles such
matters needs to be developed.
The nature of the case matters as well. Suppose I am a juror in a
criminal case and conclude (using relative plausibility) that there is a
plausible case of guilt and none of innocence, although another juror thinks
to the contrary. Whatever the outcome of the case (however the initial
disagreement was resolved), how surprised would I be that another
reasonable person’s view of the evidence turned out to be a better appraisal
of the situation than mine? Not very, I would think, for these are ambiguous
problems. Map this onto Professor Risinger’s proposal directly. Before
deliberation, my view is that I would be very surprised if the defendant were
innocent, and yours is that you would be very surprised that the defendant is
28
From ALAN HÁJEK, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY: INTERPRETATIONS
PROBABILITY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2002), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probabilityinterpret/#SubPro:

OF

Utilities (desirabilities) of outcomes, their probabilities, and rational
preferences are all intimately linked. The Port Royal Logic (Arnauld,
1662) showed how utilities and probabilities together determine
rational preferences; de Finetti’s betting analysis derives probabilities
from utilities and rational preferences; von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) derive utilities from probabilities and rational preferences. And
most remarkably, Ramsey (1926) (and later, Savage 1954 and Jeffrey
1966) derives both probabilities and utilities from rational preferences
alone.
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guilty. Having deliberated on those views, I would not be very surprised at
all if your view instead of mine were true, again because a reasonable person
considering the same evidence as I did reached a different conclusion. How
does the surprise theory handle this?
I encourage Professor Risinger to go more deeply into this interesting
theory. Like all good ideas first propounded, Professor Risinger’s is
provocative but not necessarily complete, and I raise these points as
hopefully helpful suggestions for developing it further. I should also
emphasize that Professor Risinger is not attempting to explain juridical
proof, but, I believe, to improve on what he sees. Part of the future
development of the idea should include reasons to think fact finders would
do better than they presently do by having this structure imposed upon them.
Of the two recent major analyses of burdens of proof, I focus here on
Professor Clermont’s analysis.29 Unlike Professor Risinger, Professor
Clermont is quite sure that he has a better explanation than any of those that
have been advanced to date about the nature of juridical proof, and Professor
Nance is somewhat unclear whether he is focusing on explication or
reform.30 By contrast, Professor Clermont is plainly working the same field
that I am, and I appreciate his acknowledgement that my work is the
“hardiest contortion”31 of the various corpuses on offer other than his. Were
my Mother here to guide me, she would tell me to accept the compliment,
such as it is, sit down, and shut up. Using Professor Risinger’s approach,
she would not be surprised at my disregarding her sage advice.
My view of the lay of the land is, not surprisingly, somewhat different
from Professor Clermont’s. Professor Clermont has produced a marvelous
work of scholarship reflecting great, indeed astonishing erudition.32 I think
he is plainly correct in parts of his project, but I do not think that he has
drawn the correct inferences from his own research in other critical areas.
We agree, for example, on the limited role of formal probability theory, and
that proof at trial is largely comparative. However, the sustained argument
that fuzzy logic and set theory provide a solution to the conjunction paradox,
or for that matter much help at all on questions of fact, are simply wrong.33
29

This part is indebted to Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo.
Like Professor Risinger, other recent writers are attempting to improve on the present
situation. I believe this is true of Dale Nance, and what he terms an “interpretive” approach.
DALE A. NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY POWER, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE,
AND THE TENACITY OF BELIEF 11 (2016). I put these other efforts aside because of limited
space here and because a systematic treatment is forthcoming from Allen & Pardo.
31
Clermont, supra note 5.
32
This is true of Professor Nance as well. See, e.g., NANCE, supra note 30.
33
I should point out that in a series of emails in 2011, I put Professor Clermont on notice
of the conceptual difficulties his proposal faced. Email from Ronald J. Allen, John Henry
Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, to Professor Clermont,
30
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Professor Michael Pardo and I are working on a systematic treatment of
relative plausibility and its critics,34 and this discussion complements the one
that we will provide there.
I assume general awareness of fuzzy logic. In brief, it was created to
give a means to handle linguistic vagueness in computer programming, and
in that it was quite successful. It measures the extent to which a fact (John
is five feet tall) “participates” in the (vague) set of “tall men.” There can be
more than one fuzzy set at play, and those sets can intersect, which is
sometimes (but misleadingly) also referred to as the conjunction of the sets.
The axiom of intersections of sets is that the “conjunction” of sets is equal to
the lowest value of the sets involved. Professor Clermont presents a
sustained argument that juridical proof should be analyzed as though it
primarily involved fuzzy sets so that the “conjunction” of two elements is
the smallest of the pertinent variables, and thus, although “it may sound like
magic,”35 the conjunction paradox disappears.
The problem is that it does not for the reason that began this paper: the
conjunction effect is a feature of the world, not of our logic or mathematics.
It does not change as we embrace new or different ways of thinking. This is
powerfully illustrated by a hypothetical that Professor Clermont gives that is
designed to clinch the case for fuzzy logic, but it has exactly the opposite
effect. According to Professor Clermont, the law “chooses” fuzzy logic over
probability theory because it “behave[s] more appropriately than
probabilities in a world filled with various kinds of uncertainty.36 Here is a
last clever image to make the point as to what the law deals in:
Suppose you had been in the desert for a week without drink and
you came upon two bottles marked K and M [and marked,
respectively, with a .91 membership in the fuzzy set of potable
liquids and a .91 probability of being a potable liquid].
Confronted with this pair of bottles, and given that you must drink
from the one that you chose, which would you choose to drink
from? Most people, when presented with this experiment,
immediately see that while K could contain, say, swamp water, it
would not . . . contain liquids such as hydrochloric acid. That is,
membership of 0.91 means that the contents of K are fairly similar
to perfectly potable liquids . . . . On the other hand, the probability
that M is potable “equals 0.91” means that over a long run of
experiments, the contents of M are expected to be potable in about
Robert D. Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Dec. 27, 2011) (on file with author). I
am now fleshing out the details of those points.
34
See Allen & Pardo, supra note 5.
35
Clermont, supra note 5, at 15.
36
Clermont, supra note 8, at 164–65.
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91% of the trials. In the other 9% the contents will be deadly—
about 1 chance in 10. Thus, most subjects will opt for a chance to
drink swamp water.37
How does that map onto juridical proof? For there to be any mapping
requires either that in the typical case the evidence presented has both forms
of information, or alternatively that one can change the real world by
changing one’s commitments to various versions of set theory. Let me give
my own “clever image” to demonstrate the problem. Suppose a Mr. Thomas
Bayes, a good conventional probabilist, is lost in the desert and crawling in
search of water. He comes across a Clermont bottle marked with “Water
0.91.” He says to himself, “Oh, my God, there is a 9% chance that the bottle
contains hydrochloric acid. If I drink it, I will die!” But, then he remembers
that one class he had in Advance Probability Theory on fuzzy logic, and he
says, “I swear allegiance to fuzzy logic, and therefore what is in the bottle
participates in pure water to 0.91, and thus it is perfectly safe to drink.”
Perhaps Professor Clermont disagrees, but I do not think this is how the
world works. Mr. Bayes, like the legal system, knows what he knows, and
that is the end of the matter. Maybe he knows (or believes, or whatever) that
the bottle has a 91% chance of being water, and maybe he knows or believes
it is 91% pure water, but whatever he knows will not change by switching
mental gears lying there in the desert. Nor, hopefully we all agree, will the
contents of the bottle change based upon his methodological commitments.
Now for a bit of the technical part. Professor Clermont either thinks
that the world will change because of our changing commitments to various
analytical techniques (in this case probability theory v. fuzzy logic) or that
such a change in commitment brings about a change in our knowledge of the
world, but his argument containts two fundamental mistakes of mathematical
logic that demonstrate that no such unsettling and magical phenomena are at
play. The first is that he has conflated (contorted, perhaps) the distinct ideas
of probabilistic conjunction in mathematics and set intersection in set
theory.38 The two ideas are just different, and there is no formalization that
allows the one to be transposed into the other.39 A clue to this problem
37

CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 165–66 (quoting Bogdan R. Kosanovic, Fuzziness and
Probability 2–3 (Feb. 8, 1995) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasis omitted)).
38
The contortion may stem from failing to keep distinct fuzzy logic, which employs the
concepts of conjunction and disjunction, and fuzzy set theory, which employs the different
concepts of intersection and union. For a discussion, see Jørgen Harmse, Continuous Fuzzy
Conjunctions and Disjunctions, 4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS 295 (1996). Just
as a heads-up, logic and math (including set theory) have a complicated relationship. ALFRED
NORTH WHITEHEAD & BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1910 and subsequent
editions).
39
As I discuss below, a particular problem may involve both uncertainy and vaguenss,
and a fuzzy probability is being developed to apply in such cases. However, this has nothing
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should have been evident from the foundations of set theory. Professor
Clermont seems to think that “multivalent logic” has a different “rule” for
intersection than bivalent logic that results in the radical difference in
probabilistic conjunction. As he says, “one must use multivalent logic,
including its rule that conjoined likelihood equals the likelihood of the least
likely element.”40 So far as I can tell, he derives this proposition from an
axiom (not a derivation) of fuzzy set theory, which is, as Clermont points
out, the MIN operator.41 The intersection of two sets is defined as φA∩B(x)
= min(φA(x),φB(x)), where “φ” (phi) refers to the membership function that
is necessary to define a fuzzy set. The clue that there are difficulties here is
that the analogous axiom in classical set theory can be expressed in
essentially identical terms except for the one referring to a crisp set and the
other to a fuzzy set. One form of the definition of set intersection in crisp
sets is μA∩B(x) = min(μA(x),μB(x)) where “μ” (mu) is the characteristic
function of a classical set.42 Indeed, the general view, as Clermont notes, is
that fuzzy set theory is a generalization of crisp set theory. Rather than there
being some fundamental differences in this respect, one is simply a special
case of the other. Rather obviously, the fact that classical set theory, like
fuzzy set theory, defines the intersection of sets using the MIN rule does not
warrant the conclusion that the probabilistic conjunction of two somewhat

to do with what Clermont is proposing.
40
CLERMONT, supra note 8.
41
As Clermont points out, Cohen’s inductive logic has a similar rule. See Clermont,
supra note 5 (citing L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 89–91, 265–67
(1977)). His scheme, however, is quite idiosyncratic, and in addition the mathematics were
never axiomatized. Thus it provides no support for Clermont’s approach beyond another
groundless assertion that the conjunction effect can be made to disappear. Belief functions,
by contrast, allow statements about sets of propositions, which gets nearer to Clermont’s
ideas, but how they map onto the problem Clermont is addressing is unclear. In addition, they
are quite controversial epistemically, because they often lead to obviously wrong results. See,
e.g., Jean Dezert, Pei Wang & Albena Tchamova, On The Validity of Dempster-Shafer
Theory, 15th INT’L CONF. ON INFO. FUSION 655 (2012); Lotfi A. Zadeh, A Simple View of the
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence and its Implication for the Rule of Combination, 7 AI
MAGAZINE 85 (1986). For a balanced review of belief functions that demonstrates their
complexity done by a contractor of the United States Department of Energy, see KARL SENTZ
& SCOTT FERSON, COMBINATION OF EVIDENCE IN DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY (2002),
prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgi/2002/020835.pdf. See also Special Issue: The
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence, 18 INT’ J. INTELLIGENT SYS. 1 (2003).
42
For a discussion, see Thayer Watkins, Fuzzy Logic: The Logic of Fuzzy Sets, 6,
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/fuzzysets.htm. See also Fuzzy Logic & Fuzzy Sets from
the
Instituto
Superior
Técnico,
https://fenix.tecnico.ulisboa.pt/downloadFile
/3779578815313/CDI_SI_Fuzzy_Sets_2012.pdf. The formulation in the text is the logical
equivalent of the standard formulation of set intersection. The difference is the standard
formulation refers to the elements common to the sets whereas the logical equivalence refers
to those elements that are not missing from each set. The reformulation makes the connection
between fuzzy and crisp sets clearer.
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independent events is equal to the least likely of the events.43 Nor does it
warrant that inference when dealing with fuzzy sets. As I said at the
beginning of this paragraph, the two concepts are just different and cannot
be transposed one into the other.44
The reason set theory defines intersection as it does is that it is a
measure of the extent that sets have identical members rather than a measure
of the probability within a defined probability space that one event or another
will occur. To make this clear, consider the following diagrams of (1) the
set of prime numbers between 1–10; (2) the set of prime numbers between
1–20; and (3) the set of prime numbers between 1–100. Their intersection,
or what Professor Clermont refers to as their conjunction, are the integers
two, three, five, and seven. Now ask a different question. Suppose random
draws are made from the set of integers 1–100. What is the probability of a
randomly drawn number being in one of the three original sets? It obviously
varies from set to set. Professor Clermont simply conflates (contorts?) these
two ideas.

43
In classic set theory the “min” rule identifies the elements that are members of both
sets, whereas in fuzzy set theory the min rule identifies the extent to which a member
participates in both sets and defines the intersection as the lower of the extent of participation
in the two sets. Although these are different, fuzzy sets are generally thought to be
generalizations of classic sets. See id. In both classic and fuzzy sets, intersection is one thing
and conjunction is another. Clermont has simply conflated two different ideas. See text infra
n. 43.
44
In addition to not accommodating the differing foundations and set theory, Clermont
seems to have ignored the foundations of mathematics as well. At one point he suggests that
“membership statements” within fuzzy logic can be meaningfully and easily multiplied to get
comprehensible results. CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 175. Again, this is just wrong. The
“numbers” in fuzzy logic are not precise equivalents to numbers on the number line. There
is work being done now to define arithmetic operations on member statements, but these
results bear no relationship to Professor Clermont’s discussion. See, e.g., Yingxu Wang, On
a Theory of Fuzzy Numbers and Fuzzy Arithmetic, in ADVANCES IN APPLIED AND PURE
MATHEMATICS 82 (Jerzy Balicki ed., 2014); Md. Yasin Ali, Abeda Sultana & A F M
Khodadad Khan, Comparison of Fuzzy Multiplication Operation on Triangular Fuzzy
Number, 12 J. MATHEMATICS 35 (2016); Ch.-Ch. Chou, The Canonical Representation of
Multiplication Operation on Triangular Fuzzy Numbers, 45 COMPUTERS & MATHEMATICS
WITH APPLICATIONS 1601 (2003); Shang Gao & Zaiyue Zhang, Multiplication Operation on
Fuzzy Numbers, 4 J. SOFTWARE 331 (2009).

ALLEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1008

8/8/2018 12:23 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:995

Figure 1.

It is critical to see the point here, and it is made evident by reconsidering
my “clever image” above of the hypothetical Thomas Bayes. Knowledge of
uncertainty is simply different from knowledge of the extent of participation
of an observation in a fuzzy set. The one cannot be transmuted into the other
by fiat, which is what Professor Clermont purports to do. Correctly applying
the logic of fuzzy sets, one can ask what is the intersection of the
participation of each of these sets in “prime numbers” (admittedly not all that
fuzzy of a concept, but remember that fuzzy sets are generalizations of crisp
sets) and of course the answer is that which I gave above, which is the “MIN”
value of 2, 3, 6, and 7. And, as I discuss below, this tells you little or nothing
about any probabilistic question, such as the probability of drawing such a
number in a random draw from the three sets.
There is actually a more serious problem with the analysis, and this is
the second fundamental mistake of mathematical logic in Clermont’s
argument. It confuses membership statements with fuzzy sets, and in
addition confuses fuzzy logic with fuzzy set theory. Professor Clermont
gives the following example of what he thinks shows the implications of
fuzzy set intersection, but it shows no such thing:
Begin with two membership statements . . . [that] Tom is a .30
member of A [A=tallness] and a .40 member of B [B=smartness].
Those numbers mean something like “Tom is not so tall” and
“Tom is not so smart.”
The fuzzy combination would yield: “Because Tom is not so tall
and Tom is not so smart, Tom is not such a tall, smart man,”
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[which] . . . yields a .30 belief in that intersection.45
It is true, as noted above, that the intersection of fuzzy sets is defined
as he describes, but the definition of set intersection does not extend to
membership statements, which are not sets(at least not in Clermont’s
example; sets can have sets as members but this has nothing to do with his
argument). Just as in crisp set theory and logic, the definition of set
intersection is one thing, the definition for the logical operators “and” and
“or” is another. Fuzzy set intersection has nothing to do with the likelihood
of two elements being true. Rather: “In fuzzy sets, an element may partly
belong to both sets with different memberships. A fuzzy intersection is the
lower membership in both sets of each element.”46 In Clermont’s example,
on the basis of some observation,Tom may participate in one fuzzy set to .30
and in another fuzzy set on the same observation to .40. The intersection of
these two fuzzy sets on that variable would be the “MIN” value of .30. That
is all there is to it.
The most peculiar aspect of this example is that, rather than having to
appraise the likelihood that Tom is not so tall and not so smart (“.30 belief
in that intersection”), you know exactly how tall and smart Tom is. That is
what generated the member statements in tallness and smartness in the first
place. Whatever the membership function is, a certain height participates
.30 in the fuzzy set of tallness and a certain intelligence participates .40 in
the fuzzy set of smartness. The fuzziness is in the set, and not in the
membership statement. That is probably why no person fluent in fuzzy set
theory or logic, including the publications that he cites,47 embraces the thesis
on offer, which I must confess looks like a “contortion” if ever there were
one.
45

CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 175.
Siti Zaiton Mohd Hashim, Fuzzy Logic & Fuzzy Sets, at 32,
https://comp.utm.my/sitizaiton/files/NotaSubjek/Nota%20%20AI%20(1)/Fuzzy1.pdf.
47
For example, Clermont relies on Timothy J. Ross and W. Jerry Parkinson, who have
this to say about membership statements and fuzzy sets:
46

Zadeh extended the notion of binary membership to accommodate
various “degrees of membership” on the real continuous interval [0, 1],
where the endpoints of 0 and 1 conform to no membership and full
membership, respectively, just as the indicator function does for crisp
sets, but where the infinite number of values in between the endpoints
can represent various degrees of membership for an element x in some
set in the universe. The sets in the universe X that can accommodate
“degrees of membership” were termed by Zadeh as “fuzzy sets.”
Timothy J. Ross and W. Jerry Parkinson, Fuzzy Set Theory, Fuzzy Logic, and Fuzzy Systems,
in FUZZY LOGIC AND PROBABILITY APPLICATIONS: BRIDGING THE GAP 30 (Timothy J. Ross et
al. eds., 2002). See Clermont, supra note 5, at 15–16 n.46.
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Indeed, quite at odds with the idea that one can just willy-nilly take the
definition of the intersection of sets, apply it to membership statements, and,
voila!, have a fuzzy theory of probability, those fluent in fuzzy set theory
view the kind of example Clermont gives as a probabilistic problem. It is
perfectly coherent to formally analyze the relationship between fuzziness
and probability, and today there are people working in the field to develop a
fuzzy probability theory. But that is not the hypothetical Clermont gives.
There is no notion of probability at play; the notion at play is vagueness.
You know Tom participates in the fuzzy sets of tallness and smartness and
you know exactly the extent to which this is true.
For what it is worth, the contours of the emerging area of fuzzy
probability are quite different from Professor Clermont’s proposal, but they
are exactly what one would predict. As Michael Beer describes these efforts:
Fuzzy probability theory is an extension of probability theory to
dealing with mixed probabilistic/non-probabilistic uncertainty. It
provides a theoretical basis to model uncertainty which is only
partly characterized by randomness and defies a pure probabilistic
modeling with certainty due to a lack of trustworthiness or
precision of the data or a lack of pertinent information.48
He continues:
Fuzzy probability shares the common feature of all imprecise
probability models: the uncertainty of an event is characterized
with a set of possible measure values in terms of probability, or
with bounds on probability. Its distinctive feature is that setvalued information, and hence the probability of associated
events, is described with the aid of uncertain sets according to
fuzzy set theory. This represents a marriage between fuzzy
methods and probabilistics with fuzziness and randomness as
special cases, which justifies the denotation as fuzzy randomness.
Fuzzy probability theory enables a consideration of a fuzzy set of
possible probabilistic models over the range of imprecision of the
knowledge about the underlying randomness. The associated
fuzzy probabilities provide weighted bounds on probability—the
weights of which are obtained as the membership values of the
fuzzy sets.49

48

Michael Beer, Fuzzy Probability Theory, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPLEXITY AND
SYSTEMS SCIENCE 4047, 4048 (Robert A. Meyers ed., 2009), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0387-30440-3.
49
Id. at 3049.
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The progenitor of the field, Lotfi Zadeh, agrees. Fuzzy logic does not
permit conventional probability to be dispensed with by wishing away
probabilistic effects50:
Because it is possible that both uncertainty and imprecision can be
present in the same problem, Zadeh (1995) has also claimed that
“probability must be used in concert with fuzzy logic to enhance
its effectiveness. In this perspective, probability theory and fuzzy
logic are complementary rather than competitive.”51
There are hints throughout Clermont’s complex discussion that he
understands this, although there are stronger statements suggesting that his
analysis somehow resolves or eliminates the conjunction paradox.52 On the
one hand, if all he is saying is that there are typically both uncertainty and
vagueness in legal decision-making, he would be right—”common sense” if
ever there were any. Perhaps handling the vagueness problem with some
fuzzy set influenced methodology might be useful, but so far as I can tell, his
work does not develop that idea, contenting itself with various claims of the
advantages of fuzzy set theory as a substitute for probability theory.53 On
the other hand, if he really believes that embracing fuzzy set theory actually
eliminates the conjunction problem, he is simply wrong. It remains, being
as I have said a number of times, a feature of the world and not our
characterization of the world.
The examples that Professor Clermont gives of his proposal in action
vividly highlight the contortions he is engaged in. He is right that vagueness
is a problem for legal language, but it does not translate into the superiority
of fuzzy set theory quite as he suggests. Repeatedly, Professor Clermont
50
Nozer D. Singpurwalla & Jane M. Booker, Membership Functions and Probability
Measures of Fuzzy Sets, 99 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 867, 867 (2004) (quoting Lotfi A. Zadeh,
Discussion: Probability Theory and Fuzzy Logic Are Complementary Rather Than
Competitive, 37 TECHNOMETRICS, 271, 271–76 (1995)).
51
Id. And again, the work that Singpurwalla cites agrees with this as well. Ross &
Parkinson, supra note 47, at 29. Ross and Parkinson have this to say about fuzzy sets and
probability: “To summarize, there is a clear distinction between fuzziness and randomness of
an event. Fuzziness describes the ambiguity of an event, whereas randomness describes the
likelihood of occurrence of the event.” Id. at 31.
52
In a startling disregard of mathematics, Prof. Clermont says this about his hypothetical
involving fault and identity: “While the MIN rule seems the obvious choice if identity is a
matter of occurrence uncertainty and fault is a matter of imprecise vagueness, I think it should
apply even if both factfinding percentages measure only random uncertainty.” Clermont,
supra note 8, at 178.
53
The decision theorist, David Schum, who has also an interest in legal evidence,
explored precisely this relationship, reaching conclusions bearing no relationship to those of
Professor Clermont. See, e.g., DAVID A. SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PROBABILISTIC REASONING 261–69 (1994).

ALLEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1012

8/8/2018 12:23 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:995

gives examples of how standard factual uncertainty intersects with legal
vagueness, and implicitly suggests that his examples are paradigmatic cases
of legal decision making. They are not, and the inference he draws from his
examples is unjustified. Imagine, he says:
“a plaintiff trying to prove the identity of the perpetrator being
Tom and also to prove the perpetrator being at fault. True, if the
randomized odds are 60% and 70%, the odds of Tom being at fault
are 42%. The product rule gives that result. But if the plaintiff
has proved fault to 70%, the odds on the remaining question of
Tom being the perpetrator are 60%. The MIN rule sets the
likelihood of the conjunction at 60%.54
Like Clermont, I also approve of this result, but note why. The question of
“fault” is a question of law: is what this person did within the meaning of
“fault” for the purposes of the law? Perhaps an act that “participates” 70%
in a certain concept of fault is at fault within the meaning of the law, but if
so that simply means what the person did is within the legal definition no
matter how it matches up to some idealized extreme version of the term.
Once that decision is made, it is made for all time (or at least until an
authoritative decision maker changes the outcome). Questions of “law” are
indeed questions of “fact” but they have different consequences once the
label is attached. So, if there really were any cases like this, Professor
Clermont would be right but for the wrong reason. A legal conclusion is
reached that what happened counts as fault, and now the only question is
whether Tom is the perpetrator.
But in fact, there are no legal cases like this. “Fault” is not a free
floating idea; with the possible exception of negligence, “fault” is composed
of the sum total of what a person is alleged to have done. A person is at
“fault” if he breaches a valid contract, but the factual elements of contract
breach still have to be proven. A conclusion of “fault” might be reached in
an intentional tort case after numerous facts about the event are decided, and
so on. After those facts are decided, a conclusion must be drawn as to
whether they are “breach” or “intentional tort,” or whatever, but there again
is the legal question lurking. In any event, many causes of action have
multiple factual elements, a point I presume no one will dispute.55 Even if
in each case there is legal vagueness, there remains factual uncertainty, and

54

Clermont approved of this result. Clermont, supra note 8, at 183.
Pick your favorite example. Mine has long been theft, which is the taking and carrying
away of the personal property of another with the intent to deprive the owner permanently.
Hopefully, it will not be contested that the typical cause of action comprises multiple
elements.
55
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thus there remains the specter of probability theory. Returning to the main
theme of this short paper, that uncertainty is a feature of the world and will
not go away by applying the apparatus that may be useful for deciding vague
“legal” questions to the different task of deciding factual questions. Mistakes
will continue to accumulate as a function of mistakes on discrete factual
elements, simple as that.
In his most recent discussion of the topic, Clermont notes that his
analysis has “unfortunately convinced virtually no one,” which for all the
reasons above is not surprising. To his credit, he remains undeterred and
doubles down on the analysis. Interestingly in doing so he digs his
conceptual hole deeper but in a manner that points the way out of the morass.
Clermont says:
Using the MIN rule yields the most accurate story, indeed, the
story more likely than all the other possible stories combined.
That is, the conjoined story is as likely as the weakest element,
which has already satisfied the standard of proof if each element
is more likely true than false. Moreover, the disjunction of the
falsities that combines all other possible stories is only as likely as
the most plausible of the falsities, which has already failed the
standard of proof.56
This is obviously false. As patience is probably wearing thin, take a
stylized example to make the point. Suppose a cause of action has six
independent elements and there is a two-to-one chance of each being true.
According to Clermont, no collection of stories could possibly be more likely
than this. In fact, based on what you know and disregarding any ignorance
and assuming independence, the probability of at least one other story being
true is approximately 1-(2/3)5 = 0.87. Knowledge of uncertainty simply
cannot be transmuted into the different problem of vagueness, which in turn
will straighten everything out. For one last time, you know what you know
with whatever implications it has.
Interestingly, Clermont would be right, and it would get him out of a
host of difficulties, if the fact finder is comparing the explanations on offer
and concludes that with respect to every element the plaintiff’s overall
explanation is superior to the defendant’s—in other words, more or less the
relative plausibility theory.
But wait! That sounds like comparing conjunctions. Now introduce
the point that most proof at trial is massively overlapping, and the
disagreements among explanations tend to focus on a limited set. In such
circumstances, the logical problem of conjunctions is considerably
56

Clermont, supra note 5, at 18.
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diminished if not always entirely eliminated, and this is precisely how the
legal system accommodates, domesticates, whatever, the burden of proof
instructions, just as the relative plausibility theory explains. The instructions
do focus the fact finder’s attention on, in Professor Nance’s words, the
necessary elements that an explanation must possess in order for a plaintiff
to win,57 and the overall proof process encourages, if not requires, the parties
to advance competing explanations. This takes the probabilistic sting out of
them. Generally speaking, the result is, as I say, more or less what the
relative plausibility theory predicts.58 If Clermont would drop his fallacious
argument about the magical qualities of multivalent logic and set theory, we
would welcome him into our camp.
In any event, in my opinion, the fascination with burdens of proof
played itself out.59 Explanations of juridical proof have to accommodate
burden of proof instructions as they have to accommodate the reality of
existence, but the compass of such explanations should be wider. When one
looks more generally, one sees very commonsensical practical reasoning
that, in the real world, has no choice but to compare alternative explanations
of uncertain events using a host of different cognitive tools. The single-shot
explanations of burdens of proof invariably miss the mark by failing to
accommodate the complexity of the phenomenon under examination. That
is precisely what the relative plausibility explanation is attempting to do, and
why Professor Clermont is right that it has resisted the efforts of its critics to
lay it to rest. I am also the person, however, who many years ago urged a
young William Stuntz to get out of the field of constitutional criminal
procedure because it kills brain cells. He rather tellingly proved me wrong
by being a part of a young cohort of scholars who revitalized the field.
Maybe what appears obvious to me now will likewise prove wrong. If so, I
will be content to have been part of that sand in the oyster.

57
Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical
Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947, 948–52 (1986).
58
Out of perhaps an excess of caution, note that I say “more or less” in the text. It is
obvious that the legal system does not require a comparison of each of the plaintiff’s elements
to each of the defendant’. Nonetheless, this would approximate what that legal system
actually does in many cases because of the massive overlap of evidence. Clermont and others
assert that a shortcoming of relative plausibility is that the “law” does not require defendants
to offer a competing explanation. What they mean is that the instructions on the burden of
proof do not so require, but much of the surrounding procedural context strongly encourages
precisely that. In addition, the critics never address the likelihood of a defendant winning
who has not produced a counter-explanation. In the rare case in which that happens, I predict
convictions and holdings of liability will predominate, which casual empiricism confirms.
Perhaps one source of apparent disagreement is differences in what various analysts are
analyzing. Relative plausibility is not just an explanation of the instructions of burdens of
persuasion, although it accommodates them reasonably well.
59
Even though I can’t stop writing about them. My apologies again.
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To return, finally, to the question I was supposed to address, I have no
good reason to think that fact finders are not doing a pretty good job at what
we want them to do. Of course there are erroneous and peculiar outcomes,
but there are massive numbers of cases and in any human institution things
are going to go wrong. I suspect a bigger problem would be well-intentioned
but fundamentally unjustified modifications of methods that turn out to have
unintended consequences. Indeed, you might even think that captures a fair
amount of the rules of evidence. My advice—were I forced to give it—
would be to look for ways to enhance the practical reasoning of fact finders
rather than obstruct it. A good example of this is the gradual evolution of
the hearsay rule from a rule of exclusion to a rule of admission.60 A terrible
example is the Crawford line of cases that retards reliable decision making
for the flimsiest of reasons.61 It seems like the professionals—the judges,
lawyers, and law professors—cannot stop trying to get fact finders to do what
we want them to do, rather than letting them do their job.

60

Ronald J. Allen, The Hearsay Rule as a Rule of Admission Revisited, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1395 (2016).
61
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). For an example of the problems caused
by Crawford, see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)

